The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: ''Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform'', ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] as envisioned by James Fishkin, and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]] governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of [[Market Mechanisms]]. Nevertheless, it would be possible to prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.[^''[[https://www.amazon.com/Predictocracy-Market-Mechanisms-Private-Decision/dp/0300115997/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1501217458&sr=1-1&keywords=predictocracy | Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making]]'', [[https://lifeboat.com/ex/bios.michael.b.abramowicz | Michael Abramowicz]], Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997^], and Mark Klein's [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberatorium | Deliberatorium]] online argument-mapping mechanism.

One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_voting | proxy vote transfer]]: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiquidFeedback | LiquidFeedback]] should facilitate this process.

The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: ''Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform'', ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] as envisioned by James Fishkin, and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]] governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of [[Market Mechanisms]]. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.[^''[[https://www.amazon.com/Predictocracy-Market-Mechanisms-Private-Decision/dp/0300115997/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1501217458&sr=1-1&keywords=predictocracy | Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making]]'', [[https://lifeboat.com/ex/bios.michael.b.abramowicz | Michael Abramowicz]], Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997^], and Mark Klein's [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberatorium | Deliberatorium]] online argument-mapping mechanism.

[[Project  Persephone]] is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. [[Exovivaria]], both real and [[virtual exovivaria | virtual]], would host societies requiring some form(s) of government. As well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.

One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_voting | proxy vote transfer]]: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiquidFeedback | LiquidFeedback]] might facilitate this process.

The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: ''Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform'', ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] as envisioned by James Fishkin, and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]] governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.[^''[[https://www.amazon.com/Predictocracy-Market-Mechanisms-Private-Decision/dp/0300115997/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1501217458&sr=1-1&keywords=predictocracy | Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making]]'', [[https://lifeboat.com/ex/bios.michael.b.abramowicz | Michael Abramowicz]], Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997^], and Mark Klein's [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberatorium | Deliberatorium]] online argument-mapping mechanism.

The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]]. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely.

From e-mail to Hélène Landemore:[^A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., [[http://press.princeton.edu/blog/2012/06/06/helene-landemore-on-why-were-all-in-this-together/ | "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog]]^]

One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_voting | proxy vote transfer]] whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiquidFeedback | LiquidFeedback]] might facilitate this process.

From e-mail to Helene Landemore:[^A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., [[http://press.princeton.edu/blog/2012/06/06/helene-landemore-on-why-were-all-in-this-together/ | "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog]]^]

One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_voting | proxy vote transfer]] whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiquidFeedback | LiquidFeedback]] might facilitate this process.

[[Project  Persephone]] is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. [[Exovivaria]], both real and [[virtual exovivaria | virtual]], would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.

The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]]. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. Such labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.

One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_voting | proxy vote transfer]] whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's deliberation is more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LiquidFeedback | LiquidFeedback]] might facilitate this process.

The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] and [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market | prediction markets]]. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.

The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.

From e-mail to Helene Landemore:

[[Project  Persephone]] is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. [[Exovivaria]], both real and [[virtual exovivaria]], would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.

From e-mail to Helene Landemore

[[Project  Persephone]] is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_opinion_poll | deliberative opinion polling]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_S._Fishkin | Fishkin, James S.]]: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991^] and prediction markets.

[[Project  Persephone]] is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance.

->I think Hanson has said that [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futarchy | futarchy]][^[[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robin_Hanson | Hanson, Robin]] (August 2000). [[http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.html | "Futarchy: Vote values, but bet beliefs"]]^] wouldn't really work unless the futarchic policy decision were automatic. Obviously, that's not very democratic by any reasonable definition.

->But maybe you could make it automatic ''unless'' challenged by a majority in plebiscite, with some reasonable number of petition signers (say, 1% of the electorate) required for the challenge. At which point it would be subject to deliberative polling. If it passed the deliberative poll, it would be scheduled for implementation but again subject to halting by petition-triggered plebiscite (perhaps requiring a higher fraction of signatures this time, like 5%). At which point you deliberatively poll again, randomly selecting only among those who hadn't been through any earlier deliberative poll on the issue. If you keep repeating, *theoretically*, this can get to 100% voter representation eventually. But at that point, everyone who might vote against it has already been represented in deliberative polling -- why would a majority vote against it in a referendum if they'd voted for it in deliberation? (Unless for some very good reason, like discovering fraud in the preparation of deliberative poll materials.) And if the petition signature threshold requirements keep going higher, the repeated-stalling process probably halts long before you get anywhere near 100%.

->But maybe you could make it automatic *unless* challenged by a majority in plebiscite, with some reasonable number of petition signers (say, 1% of the electorate) required for the challenge. At which point it would be subject to deliberative polling. If it passed the deliberative poll, it would be scheduled for implementation but again subject to halting by petition-triggered plebiscite (perhaps requiring a higher fraction of signatures this time, like 5%). At which point you deliberatively poll again, randomly selecting only among those who hadn't been through any earlier deliberative poll on the issue. If you keep repeating, *theoretically*, this can get to 100% voter representation eventually. But at that point, everyone who might vote against it has already been represented in deliberative polling -- why would a majority vote against it in a referendum if they'd voted for it in deliberation? (Unless for some very good reason, like discovering fraud in the preparation of deliberative poll materials.) And if the petition signature threshold requirements keep going higher, the repeated-stalling process probably halts long before you get anywhere near 100%.

->I think Hanson has said that futarchy wouldn't really work unless the futarchic policy decision were automatic. Obviously, that's not very democratic by any reasonable definition.