PmWiki.Governance History
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The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling1 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of Market Mechanisms. Nevertheless, it would be possible to prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.2, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling3 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of Market Mechanisms. Nevertheless, it would be possible to prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but also by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.4, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as LiquidFeedback should facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as LiquidFeedback should facilitate this process. The final decision on who joins the deliberations could be made using Evaluative Proportional Representation.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling5 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of Market Mechanisms. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.6, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling7 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of Market Mechanisms. Nevertheless, it would be possible to prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.8, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government. As well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government. As well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework should be possible.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as LiquidFeedback should facilitate this process.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling9 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.10, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling11 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision -- one of a class of Market Mechanisms. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.12, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling13 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling14 as envisioned by James Fishkin, and prediction markets governance as envisioned by Robin Hanson. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely. The idea is largely inspired not just by Fishkin and Hanson, but by Michael Abramowicz's view of predictocracy.15, and Mark Klein's Deliberatorium online argument-mapping mechanism.
From e-mail to Hélène Landemore:16
From e-mail to Hélène Landemore:17
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. An alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer: Whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand, they can hand their vote off to another member. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve them in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling20 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. Such labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government. As well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
The current proposal attempts to strike a balance between deliberative opinion polling21 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent that otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the membership has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. By design, such labored outcomes are highly unlikely.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's deliberation is more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's contributions would be more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
One reasonable objection to any democratic procedure that incorporates Deliberative Opinion Polling (DP) is that DP virtually requires "drafting" members to involve themselves in deliberation. One alternative is to offer some sort of proxy vote transfer whenever someone is randomly selected but doesn't want to participate, can't participate, or feels that someone else's deliberation is more appropriate to the issue at hand. Software such as LiquidFeedback might facilitate this process.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling22 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling23 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue. Such labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling24 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling25 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual exovivaria, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
From e-mail to Helene Landemore
From e-mail to Helene Landemore:
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling27 and prediction markets.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. Exovivaria, both real and virtual exovivaria, would host societies requiring some form(s) of government; as well, the organization itself will need to be governed. A uniform framework might be possible.
The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling28 and prediction markets. This system would default to the prediction market decision. Nevertheless, it would be possible prevent otherwise-automatic policy implementation through a series of policy-recall petitions and deliberations. Theoretically, this procedure can converge on pure majority rule, but only after much of the electorate has been required to participate in formal deliberations on the issue; such a labored outcomes are highly unlikely, however, by design.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance.
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance. The current main proposal attempts to strike a compromise between deliberative opinion polling29 and prediction markets.
1 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
2 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
3 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
4 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
5 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
6 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
7 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
8 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
9 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
10 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
11 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
12 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
13 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
14 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
15 Predictocracy: Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making, Michael Abramowicz, Yale University Press, 2008, ISBN 0300115997 ⇑
16 A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog ⇑
17 A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., "Hélène Landemore on why we're all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog ⇑
18 A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog ⇑
19 A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog ⇑
20 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
21 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
22 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
23 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
24 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
25 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
26 A Yale political science professor whose theme is "democratic reason"; see e.g., "Hélène Landemore on why we’re all in this together", 6 June 2012, Princeton University Press blog ⇑
27 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
28 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
29 Fishkin, James S.: Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform, ISBN 0-300-05161-1, Yale University Press, 1991 ⇑
30 Hanson, Robin (August 2000). "Futarchy: Vote values, but bet beliefs" ⇑
31 Hanson, Robin (August 2000). "Futarchy: Vote values, but bet beliefs" ⇑
32 Hanson, Robin (August 2000). "Futarchy: Vote values, but bet beliefs" ⇑
Project Persephone is, among other things, a collection of experiments in governance.
From e-mail to Helene Landemore